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LESSONS FROM NEW ORLEANS: A STRONGER 
ROLE FOR PUBLIC DEFENDERS IN SPURRING 
INDIGENT DEFENSE REFORM 
ACE M. FACTOR† 
ABSTRACT 
  Excessive caseloads prevent public defenders from fulfilling their 
ethical obligations and curtail criminal defendants’ right to the effective 
assistance of counsel. Despite this ethical and constitutional dilemma, 
legislators have been reluctant to provide adequate funds for indigent 
defense. And because of the separation of powers, courts have been 
unable to force legislators’ hands. Against this backdrop, criminal 
defendants in states that choose not to adequately fund indigent defense 
face a serious risk of wrongful conviction.   
  The Orleans Public Defenders Office (OPD) provides a case study 
of public defenders playing a stronger role in spurring legislative 
reform. In response to a funding crisis in Louisiana, the OPD refused 
to take new cases beyond constitutionally permissible workloads. This 
refusal resulted in criminal defendants being put on waiting lists for 
representation, which garnered national attention, gave rise to class 
action lawsuits against the state, and created a threat to public safety. 
These are governance problems that legislators prioritize over funding 
indigent defense. The OPD’s refusal to take new cases has been 
somewhat successful: in response to this crisis, the state legislature has 
provided additional funds to public defenders’ offices in the state.  
  Public defenders are in a unique position to put pressure on 
legislators. By refusing to take new cases that would cause their 
workloads to be excessive, public defenders can both maintain their 
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obligations to the profession and ensure constitutional representation 
for their clients. 
INTRODUCTION 
Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to the effective 
assistance of counsel,1 and criminal defense lawyers have an ethical 
obligation to provide competent representation.2 But these two 
fundamental principles come into conflict when public defenders’ 
excessive caseloads make competent representation impossible.3  
In public defenders’ offices with particularly heavy caseloads, a 
public defender may have only a few hours to devote to each client.4 
The public defenders in New Orleans work long hours investigating 
and trying cases and visiting their clients in jail. But they have a 
“pervading sense that they can never do enough.”5 One New Orleans 
public defender, Lauren Anderson, has had to tell defendants, “Not 
only can I not help, but nobody from my office can help you, either.”6 
Public defenders like Anderson, while “juggling 300 or more cases at 
once,” are often not able to adequately investigate their cases or visit 
their clients, who, if arrested in Orleans Parish, are sometimes jailed 
more than 250 miles away.7 While defendants wait for representation, 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335, 339–40 (1962). 
 2. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (“A lawyer shall 
provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires . . . preparation 
reasonably necessary for the representation.”). 
 3. See NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE 
TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 14 (2009) (“[C]rushing 
workloads make it impossible for many defenders to effectively represent clients. Too often, 
counsel is unable to spend sufficient time on each of their cases. This forces even the most 
competent and dedicated attorneys to run afoul of their professional duties.”); Tina Peng, I’m a 
Public Defender. It’s Impossible for Me to Do a Good Job Representing My Clients, WASH.  
POST (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/our-public-defender-system-isnt-
just-broken—its-unconstitutional/2015/09/03/aadf2b6c-519b-11e5-9812-92d5948a40f8_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/C7UL-3SHU] (“The American Bar Association recommends that public 
defenders not work on more than 150 felony cases a year. In 2014, I handled double that.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Peng, supra note 3 (describing the work conditions at the Orleans Public 
Defenders Office (OPD)). 
 5. Jed Lipinski, The Trials and Travails of a New Orleans Public Defender, NOLA.COM 
(Mar. 30, 2016, 8:45 AM), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2016/03/new_orleans_public_
defender_trials_and_travails.html [https://perma.cc/E873-LMZF]. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
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stories can change and important evidence can disappear.8 And 
without lawyers to investigate these leads, defendants face a serious 
risk of wrongful conviction.  
Excessive caseloads and severe underfunding of public defenders’ 
offices systematically deprive criminal defendants of their right to 
effective counsel. These are well-documented problems,9 and the need 
for reform is not new.10 The harder question is how that reform should 
happen.  
One route is reform through the political process. State 
legislatures allocate funds to public defenders’ offices, and in a perfect 
world, the head of a given public defenders’ office could simply explain 
the conundrum to the legislature and urge it to allocate more funds to 
public defense.11 In practice, though, representation for criminal 
 
 8. For a description of a case that was taken by a private attorney in New Orleans who was 
able to uncover exculpatory evidence in Houston, Texas, evidence which the OPD would not 
have been able to retrieve due to its excessive caseloads, see Scott Greenfield, Cross: Derwyn 
Bunton, Fighting for the Poor of New Orleans, MIMESIS LAW (Aug. 3, 2016), http://mimesislaw.
com/fault-lines/cross-derwyn-bunton-fighting-for-the-poor-of-new-orleans/11837 [https://perma.
cc/L6G8-5FBB] (“I realized my office could not guarantee the timely retrieval of this important 
evidence before it was erased or otherwise destroyed. This would have left an innocent man to 
face trial for his life for what was labeled an act of ‘domestic terror’ by the mayor of New 
Orleans.”). 
 9. See NORMAN LEFSTEIN, AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & 
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS: ETHICS AND LAW IN PUBLIC 
DEFENSE 12 (2011) (“There is abundant evidence that those who furnish public defense services 
across the country have far too many cases, and this reality impacts the quality of their 
representation, often severely eroding the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right  
to counsel.”); NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S  
CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 7 (2009), http://
www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/139.pdf [https://perma.cc/J75P-VJZB] 
[hereinafter JUSTICE DENIED] (“[T]he country’s current fiscal crisis . . . ha[s] severe adverse 
consequences for the funding of indigent defense services, which already receives substantially 
less financial support compared to prosecution and law enforcement. Undoubtedly, the most 
visible sign of inadequate funding is attorneys attempting to provide defense services while 
carrying astonishingly large caseloads.”); Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel 
in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1045 (2006) (“By every measure in 
every report analyzing the U.S. criminal justice system, the defense function for poor people is 
drastically underfinanced.”); Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role 
in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 826 (2009) (“Systematic underfunding of criminal 
defense representation in the state courts persists, resulting in repeated and widespread 
breakdowns in defense representation in many states.” (footnote omitted)).  
 10. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 50 (“Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s Gideon decision 
in 1963, several organizations have conducted national studies of indigent defense over several 
decades. Invariably, these studies conveyed a grim view of defense services in criminal and 
juvenile cases, pointing out many problems in providing counsel across the country.”).  
 11. Greenfield, supra note 8 (“[T]he best and longest-lasting change comes at the legislative 
level. So ultimately the best solution is the one where OPD and other system stakeholders and 
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defendants is not a top priority for legislatures.12 State governments 
commonly spend three times as much on prosecutions as on public 
defense, and “no state has ever enacted a statute that requires 
automatic increases in the size of defender programs when 
prosecutions increase.”13  
In some instances, courts have exercised their “inherent 
authority” and “supervisory jurisdiction” to remedy systemic 
constitutional violations of the right to counsel. Although the 
separation of powers has limited courts from ordering additional funds, 
these types of judicial interventions have had some success in changing 
legislative priorities.14 
Another potential solution is class action litigation. It has had 
some success in spurring legislatures to fund public defense.15 Lawsuits 
provide indigent defendants a route to vindicate their Sixth 
Amendment rights on a class-wide basis when states fail to provide 
adequate representation. In New York, for example, indigent criminal 
defendants brought a class action lawsuit, and the parties reached a 
significant settlement with the state that required structural reform, 
which included additional funding for indigent defense.16  
 
decision makers reform our user-pay criminal justice system in Louisiana.”). Indeed, the National 
Right to Counsel Committee provided a number of recommendations to ensure that states 
comply with the Constitution. Its first recommendation was that “legislators should appropriate 
adequate funds so that quality indigent defense services can be provided.” JUSTICE DENIED, 
supra note 9, at 11, 183.  
 12. See Steven N. Yermish, Ethical Issues in Indigent Defense: The Continuing Crisis of 
Excessive Caseloads, 33 CHAMPION 22, 22 (2009) (“In the face of severe government revenue 
shortfalls, indigent defense has been a favorite target for cost savings at the expense of the 
constitutional rights of the poor in our courtrooms.”); Julia O’Donoghue, Inadequate 
Representation: No More Money Expected for Public Defenders, NOLA.COM (Apr. 18, 2016, 4:06 
PM), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/04/public_defender_funding.html#incart_most
_shared-crime [https://perma.cc/DZK7-ZRRX] (“While hundreds of poor people wait in jail to 
be appointed a lawyer, a judge . . . threatens to release defendants and suits are filed challenging 
the constitutionality of Louisiana’s criminal justice system, lawmakers say they have no plans to 
increase funding for an office designed to protect basic legal rights.”).  
 13. LEFSTEIN, supra note 9, at 23. 
 14. For further discussion of indigent defense reform through the judiciary, see infra Part 
III.A. But see Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to Address Underfunded Indigent 
Defense Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1733 (2005) (“[T]hese decisions have been unable to 
facilitate long-term, sustainable reform of the indigent defense system.”). 
 15. See generally Margaret A. Costello, Fulfilling the Unfulfilled Promise of Gideon: 
Litigation as a Viable Strategic Tool, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1951, 1962–68 (2014) (providing examples 
of class action lawsuits that were successful at “raising public awareness and precipitating 
legislative reform”). 
 16. Stipulation and Order of Settlement at 5–9, Hurrell-Harring v. State, No. 8866-07 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Oct. 21, 2014), https://www.ils.ny.gov/files/Hurrell-Harring%20Final%20Settlement%
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The Orleans Public Defenders Office (OPD) provides a troubling 
case study of these different routes to reform. The excessive caseloads 
at the OPD pose an ethical dilemma for public defenders, impinge on 
indigent criminal defendants’ right to counsel, and have created a 
threat to public safety. Public defenders in New Orleans have resorted 
to putting clients on a waiting list for representation.17 A court has 
ordered the release of several criminal defendants charged with serious 
felonies because the state had denied them representation.18 And the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Southern Poverty 
Law Center have filed class action lawsuits on behalf of the 
unrepresented indigent criminal defendants, alleging that the 
defendants have been deprived of their Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal 
protection.19  
Although the perfect solution to these problems remains unclear, 
the OPD’s refusal to accept new cases represents one starting point. 
And this response may have been effective—the Louisiana legislature 
recently increased funding for public defenders’ offices.20  
This Note argues for a stronger institutional role for public 
defenders in spurring legislative reform. When criminal defendants go 
unrepresented, the appropriate remedy is release. This creates a public 
safety problem, which ranks higher than funding for indigent defense 
on most legislators’ lists of priorities. By refusing cases to maintain 
manageable caseloads, public defenders can both fulfill their ethical 
 
20102114.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NEQ-8YSJ]; see also Victoria Bekiempis, How New York Is 
Finally Helping Poor Defendants, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 22, 2014, 11:47 AM), http://www.
newsweek.com/new-york-tktk-landmark-public-defense-case-278889 [https://perma.cc/4FLZ-ZL
8W] (describing the Hurrell-Harring litigation and the benefits of the settlement with the state); 
Press Release, N.Y. Civil Liberties Union, Settlement Begins Historic Reformation of Defense in 
New York State (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.nyclu.org/news/settlement-begins-historic-
reformation-of-public-defense-new-york-state [https://perma.cc/ZS7R-P5RR] (describing how 
the Hurrell-Harring settlement agreement implemented new funding and other measures for 
public defense).  
 17. For further discussion of the OPD’s response to budget shortages,  see infra notes 166–
75 and accompanying text. 
 18. See, e.g., Martha Neil, Due to Lack of Counsel, New Orleans Judge Freezes Cases  
Against 7 Inmates and Orders Their Release, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 8, 2016, 4:00 PM), http://www. 
abajournal.com/news/article/due_to_lack_of_counsel_new_orleans_judge_freezes_cases_against
_7_inmates [https://perma.cc/U89F-6V4Z] (describing a New Orleans judge’s order releasing 
inmates “charged with serious felonies—including rape and second-degree murder—because 
they have been held for months without access to counsel”). 
 19. For further discussion of the class action lawsuits, see infra Part IV.C.3. 
 20. For further discussion of the Louisiana legislature’s response to the state’s indigent 
defense crisis, see infra notes 213–17 and accompanying text. 
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obligations and play a political role in putting pressure on legislatures 
to adequately fund indigent defense. 
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background on 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Part II details the ethical rules 
implicated by excessive caseloads. Part III analyzes two possible routes 
to reform: reform through the courts and reform through class action 
lawsuits. Part IV is a case study of the New Orleans public defenders’ 
office. It reveals a gap between the constitutional rights of the indigent 
accused and the practical realities facing underfunded public 
defenders’ offices. It uses the OPD as a model for a stronger role for 
public defenders in orienting legislative priorities toward funding 
indigent defense.  
I.  THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”21 In Gideon v. Wainwright,22 the 
Supreme Court observed that “in our adversary system of criminal 
justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, 
cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This 
seems to us to be an obvious truth.”23 The Court pronounced that 
lawyers “are necessities, not luxuries,” and held that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel is a fundamental right that applies to the 
states.24 
The scope of the right to counsel has expanded over the years.25 
Nine years after Gideon, the Court extended the obligation to provide 
attorneys to those charged with misdemeanors for which imprisonment 
is a real possibility.26 In subsequent years, the Court has held that “the 
right to counsel [means] the right to effective assistance of counsel,”27 
and that “[a]n accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether 
retained or appointed, who plays the role necessary to ensure that the 
 
 21. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 22. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). For a fascinating and in-depth account of 
Gideon, see generally ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET (1964).  
 23. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.  
 24. Id.  
 25. See JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 22–27 (providing an account of the expansion of 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel). 
 26. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36–37 (1972).  
 27. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377 (1986). 
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trial is fair.”28 The Court has further expanded the right to counsel to 
apply “once adversary proceedings have commenced,”29 at a 
defendant’s initial court appearance,30 to representation during a first 
appeal of a conviction,31 and to appeals of guilty pleas.32    
Most recently, in Missouri v. Frye33 and Lafler v. Cooper,34 the 
Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to effective 
assistance of counsel before trial at all “critical stages,” including plea 
bargaining.35 The Court’s holdings in Frye and Lafler are implicated in 
the public defender context because a public defender who has not had 
time to meet with her client cannot adequately advise the client about 
a plea bargain.36  
In theory, Gideon and the subsequent expansion of the right to 
counsel provide substantial structural protections for indigent 
defendants.37 Yet although the right to counsel has expanded, there has 
been near unanimous agreement that the “promise” of Gideon has 
been denied to many criminal defendants.38 In a report titled Securing 
Reasonable Caseloads: Ethics and Law in Public Defense, the 
American Bar Association (ABA) details the results of several studies, 
 
 28. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984). 
 29. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401 (1977).  
 30. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008). 
 31. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963). 
 32. Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 610 (2005). 
 33. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012). 
 34. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012). 
 35. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 170 (“[C]riminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, 
not a system of trials. . . . As explained in Frye, the right to adequate assistance of counsel cannot 
be defined or enforced without taking account of the central role plea bargaining plays in securing 
convictions and determining sentences.”); Frye, 566 U.S. at 143 (“[P]lea bargains have become so 
central to the administration of the criminal justice system that defense counsel have 
responsibilities in the plea bargain process, responsibilities that must be met to render the 
adequate assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment requires in the criminal process at 
critical stages.”). 
 36. For an argument that Lafler and Frye have a limited impact on plea bargaining because 
of poorly structured indigent defense services, see Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining: The Impact of Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561, 
576–82 (2014).  
 37. In Gideon, the Court explained that an indigent criminal defendant “requires the guiding 
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him,” because, “[w]ithout it, though he 
be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his 
innocence.” Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 
U.S. 45, 69 (1932)).  
 38. David Rudovsky, Gideon and the Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Rhetoric and the 
Reality, 32 L. & INEQUALITY 371, 372 (2014) (“[T]here is near unanimous agreement that the 
‘promise’ of Gideon has been systematically denied to large numbers of criminal defendants.”). 
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concluding that “those who furnish public defense services across the 
country have far too many cases,” which “severely erod[es] the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee of the right to counsel.”39 Former Attorney 
General Eric Holder summed up the empty promise of Gideon in an 
address to the National Summit on Indigent Defense in 2012:  
Ever since the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Gideon v. 
Wainwright – handed down fifty years ago next March – it has been 
settled law that the Constitution requires defendants in criminal cases 
to be provided with legal counsel, even if they cannot afford an 
attorney. Yet, as we come together this afternoon – in jurisdictions 
here in Louisiana and across the country – the basic rights guaranteed 
under Gideon have yet to be fully realized. Millions of Americans still 
struggle to access the legal services that they need and deserve – and 
to which they are constitutionally entitled. And far too many public 
defender systems lack the basic tools they need to function properly.40 
In a comprehensive study on indigent defense forty years after 
Gideon, the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent 
Defendants concluded “that inadequate compensation for indigent 
defense attorneys is a national problem, which makes the recruitment 
and retention of experienced attorneys extraordinarily difficult.”41 The 
ABA committee described the indigent defense system as one that 
“lacks fundamental fairness” and “places poor persons at constant risk 
of wrongful conviction.”42  
Much ink has been spilled about the causes of the failure to fulfill 
Gideon’s promise. Some scholars blame the structure of Gideon for its 
“unfunded mandate” on the states.43 Others suggest that institutions—
 
 39. LEFSTEIN, supra note 9, at 12; see also id. at 12–19 (detailing results of previous studies). 
 40. Eric Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., Speech to the American Bar Association’s National 
Summit on Indigent Defense (Feb. 4, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-
eric-holder-speaks-american-bar-association-s-national-summit-indigent [https://perma.cc/Q32V
-NCTY] (italics added). 
 41. AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, 
GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 9 (2004). 
 42. Id. at 38; see also Eve Brensike Primus, Effective Trial Counsel After Martinez v. Ryan: 
Focusing on the Adequacy of State Procedures, 122 YALE L.J. 2604, 2606 (2013) (“Everyone knows 
that excessive caseloads, poor funding, and a lack of training plague indigent defense delivery 
systems throughout the states.”).  
 43. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Lessons from Gideon, 122 YALE L.J. 2676, 2680 (2013) 
(“The Court imposed an unfunded mandate on state governments without any enforcement 
mechanism . . . .”); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-569, INDIGENT 
DEFENSE: DOJ COULD INCREASE AWARENESS OF ELIGIBLE FUNDING AND BETTER 
DETERMINE THE EXTENT TO WHICH FUNDS HELP SUPPORT THIS PURPOSE 17 (2012) (“[T]wo-
thirds or more of the survey respondents who were recipients of the DOJ formula grants for which 
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namely, legislatures and the courts—are to blame for choosing not to 
adequately fund indigent defense and refusing to take activist measures 
to implement Gideon’s promise.44 But all can agree that underfunded 
indigent defense systems and overworked public defenders have 
limited the effectiveness and the practical reach of Gideon and its 
progeny.45 
II.  ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS  
A. ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Relating to Excessive 
Caseloads 
Excessive caseloads for public defenders implicate several of the 
ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules). 
Although the Model Rules are not binding on the states, and there are 
some minor variations among the state rules,46 all of the state rules of 
professional conduct require “competent” representation and define 
competence according to the Model Rules’ definition.47  
The Model Rules regarding competence and diligence directly 
target the quality of legal services. The Model Rules require lawyers to 
provide competent representation, to exercise diligence, and to 
communicate with clients about their cases. The Supreme Court has 
said that the core of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is the 
“opportunity for a defendant to consult with an attorney to have him 
 
indigent defense was not a required use or Tribal Courts TPA distributions reported that they did 
not allocate funding for indigent defense, partly because of other competing priorities, such as 
law enforcement needs.”). 
 44. See Carol S. Steiker, Gideon at Fifty: A Problem of Political Will, 122 YALE L.J. 2694, 
2701 (2013) (advocating for “mov[ing] the political actors who control the power of the purse . . . 
and the shape of the substantive criminal law to allocate the resources and make the institutional 
changes that are necessary to fix what in many jurisdictions is a failing system of indigent 
defense”). 
 45. See, e.g., KAREN HOUPPERT, CHASING GIDEON: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR POOR 
PEOPLE’S JUSTICE 251 (2013) (“Almost everyone in all parts of the criminal justice system across 
the United States acknowledges deep flaws in the way representation is provided to poor 
people.”); Mark Walsh, Living Up to the Gideon Ideal, 99 A.B.A. J. 45, 46 (2013) (noting that 
although the decision was “being celebrated on its 50th anniversary, one report after another over 
the years has documented the nation’s failure to truly live up to the ideal of Gideon”).  
 46. MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ, RICHARD C. WYDICK, REX R. PERSCHBACHER & DEBRA 
LYN BASSETT, PROBLEMS IN LEGAL ETHICS 40 (6th ed. 2003) (“Each state has a set of ethics 
[rules] that govern[s] the lawyers in the state. In addition, some states have special statutes that 
govern the conduct of lawyers . . . .”); JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 35 n.81 (“The three states 
in which the ethical rules are most dissimilar in format from the ABA Model Rules are California, 
Maine, and New York.”). 
 47. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 35–36.  
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investigate the case and prepare a defense for trial.”48 So the Model 
Rules relating to the “core” of the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel 
are especially important.  
Lawyers are required to take time to thoroughly prepare for each 
case. Rule 1.1 provides that “[a] lawyer shall provide competent 
representation to a client.”49 The next sentence of the rule describes 
“competent representation” as requiring “the legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation.”50  
The Model Rules also require lawyers to control their caseloads. 
A lawyer must “act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing a client.”51 And “[a] lawyer’s work load must be 
controlled so that each matter can be handled competently.”52 
Although the Rules do not prescribe a formula for determining 
whether a workload is excessive, the number of cases, case complexity, 
“the availability of support services, the lawyer’s experience and 
ability, and the lawyer’s nonrepresentational duties” are factors that a 
lawyer should consider when deciding whether to take on a new case.53  
A lawyer must consider the impact that taking on a new 
representation may have on a current client.54 A lawyer “shall not 
represent a client” if representation “will result in violation of the rules 
 
 48. Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 590 (2008) (“The core of this right has historically been, 
and remains today, the ‘opportunity for a defendant to consult with an attorney and to have him 
investigate the case and prepare a defense for trial.’” (quoting Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 
348 (1990))). 
 49. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. r. 1.3.  
 52. Id. r. 1.3 cmt. 2.  
 53. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441, at 4 (2006) 
[hereinafter Formal Op. 06-441]. An American Bar Association (ABA) report on the public 
defense delivery system states: 
Counsel’s workload, including appointed and other work, should never be so large as 
to interfere with the rendering of quality representation or lead to the breach of ethical 
obligations, and counsel is obligated to decline appointments above such levels. 
National caseload standards should in no event be exceeded, but the concept of 
workload (i.e., caseload adjusted by factors such as case complexity, support services, 
and an attorney’s nonrepresentational duties) is a more accurate measurement. 
AM. BAR ASS’N, TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 2 (2002) 
[hereinafter TEN PRINCIPLES]. 
 54. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015); see id. r. 1.16(a)(1) 
(stating that a lawyer “shall not represent a client” if “the representation will result in violation 
of the rules of professional conduct or other law”). 
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of professional conduct or other law.”55 And lawyers may not “avoid 
appointment” to represent indigent defendants except for “good 
cause.”56 Comment 2 to Rule 1.3 specifically states that a lawyer’s 
ability to “handle the matter competently” is considered good cause.57  
Excessive caseloads can also create conflicts of interest.58 The 
ABA has recognized this type of conflict in situations where excessive 
caseloads force a lawyer “to choose among the interests of various 
clients, depriving at least some, if not all clients, of competent and 
diligent defense services.”59 Every additional case an overburdened 
public defender takes on creates a significant risk that the lawyer will 
not have the time to provide competent representation. This materially 
limits the public defender’s responsibilities to other clients.  
Supervisory lawyers have a duty to ensure that subordinate 
lawyers provide competent and diligent representation. A lawyer with 
managerial authority “shall make reasonable efforts” to ensure that all 
lawyers conform to the Model Rules.60 And subordinate lawyers (in the 
public defender context, line-level public defenders) cannot escape 
their duties just because they were assigned excessive caseloads by 
their superiors. Subordinate lawyers are bound by the Model Rules 
“notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another 
person.”61 Excessive caseloads pose problems both for supervisory 
lawyers who continue to accept cases in excess of a manageable 
workload, and for subordinate lawyers who are unable to manage their 
caseloads.  
Constitutional protections have been buttressed by the Model 
Rules. But for lawyers with unwieldy caseloads, adherence to the rules 
of professional conduct may be impossible. Excessive caseloads limit a 
lawyer’s ability to investigate her clients’ innocence or any mitigating 
circumstances. And the failure to provide competent representation 
 
 55. Id. r. 1.16(a)(1). Under Rule 1.16, an exception allows a court to order a lawyer to 
continue representation “notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation.” Id. r. 
1.16(c).  
 56. Id. r. 6.2(a). 
 57. Id. r. 6.2(a) cmt. 2.  
 58. For an example of heavy workloads forcing attorneys to choose between clients, see 
supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text.  
 59. AM. BAR ASS’N, EIGHT GUIDELINES OF PUBLIC DEFENSE RELATED TO EXCESSIVE 
WORKLOADS 5 (2009) [hereinafter EIGHT GUIDELINES]. 
 60. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). 
 61. Id. r. 5.2.  
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can render counsel “constructively absent” at critical stages of a 
proceeding.62 
B. The ABA’s Response to Public Defenders’ Excessive Caseloads 
The ABA addressed excessive caseloads by promulgating a set of 
principles and standards.63 One principle states that “[d]efense 
counsel’s workload is controlled to permit the rendering of quality 
representation”; another demands “parity between defense counsel 
and the prosecution with respect to resources” and that defense 
counsel be “included as an equal partner in the judicial system.”64  
More recently, prompted by the “endemic problem of excessive 
caseloads for state public defenders,”65 the ABA responded by issuing 
a formal ethics opinion.66 The ABA opinion is consistent with previous 
state bar ethics opinions that instruct public defenders not to take on 
 
 62. For an argument that excessive caseloads render counsel “constructively absent,” see 
LAURENCE A. BRENNER, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y L. & POLICY, WHEN EXCESSIVE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER WORKLOADS VIOLATE THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL WITHOUT A 
SHOWING OF PREJUDICE 2 (2011).  
  63. In 1992, it published its third edition of the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: 
Providing Defense Services. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES (3d ed. 1992). These standards “cover all of the important 
elements related to the structure of public defense programs, such as securing the independence 
of the defense function, assigned counsel programs, contract defense services, public defender 
programs, eligibility for defense services, and waiver of counsel.” JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, 
at 32.  
 Hoping to condense the standards, in 2002, the ABA published Ten Principles of a Public 
Defense Delivery System. See generally TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 53 (condensing the standards 
published in the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Providing Defense Services). The Ten 
Principles are as follows: (1) “The public defense function, including the selection, funding, and 
payment of defense counsel, is independent.” (2) “Where the caseload is sufficiently high, the 
public defense delivery system consists of both a defender office and the active participation of 
the private bar.” (3) “Clients are screened for eligibility and defense counsel is assigned and 
notified of appointment, as soon as feasible after clients’ arrest, detention, or request for counsel.” 
(4) “Defense counsel is provided sufficient time and a confidential space within which to meet 
with the client.” (5) “Defense counsel’s workload is controlled to permit the rendering of quality 
representation.” (6) “Defense counsel’s ability, training, and experience match the complexity of 
the case.” (7) “The same attorney continuously represents the client until completion of the case.” 
(8) “There is parity between defense counsel and the prosecution with respect to resources and 
defense counsel is included as an equal partner in the judicial system.” (9) “Defense counsel is 
provided with and required to attend continuing legal education.” (10) “Defense counsel is 
supervised and systematically reviewed for quality and efficiency according to nationally and 
locally adopted standards.” Id. at 1. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Peter A. Joy, Rationing Justice by Rationing Lawyers, 37 WASH U. J.L. & POL’Y 205, 219 
(2011). 
 66. Formal Op. 06-441, supra note 53. 
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more cases than they can handle competently67 and to decline 
additional cases when excessive caseloads interfere with their ability to 
provide competent representation.68 
In the opinion, the ABA defines excessive caseloads and discusses 
what lawyers should do when faced with them:  
If a lawyer believes that her workload is such that she is unable to 
meet the basic ethical obligations required of her in the 
representation of a client, she must not continue to represent that 
client, or, if representation has not yet begun, she must decline the 
representation. 
  A lawyer’s primary ethical duty is owed to existing clients. 
Therefore, a lawyer must decline to accept new cases, rather than 
withdraw from existing cases, if the acceptance of a new case will 
result in her workload becoming excessive. When an existing 
workload does become excessive, the lawyer must reduce it to the 
extent that what remains to be done can be handled in full compliance 
with the Rules.69 
Note that the test for whether a lawyer’s caseload is excessive is a 
subjective one. It requires lawyers to take action to reduce their 
caseloads, and, if caseloads remain excessive, “move to withdraw as 
counsel in existing cases to the extent necessary to bring the workload 
down to a manageable level.”70 
The opinion also explains supervisors’ responsibility to ensure that 
caseloads are manageable. It requires supervisors to monitor the 
workloads of subordinate lawyers to ensure that workloads are 
appropriate.71   
In 2009, the ABA expanded on its ethics opinion by adopting 
Eight Guidelines of Public Defense Related to Excessive Workloads, 
 
 67. See, e.g., Ariz. Comm. on the Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Formal Op. 01-06 (2001) 
(suggesting that public defenders should not take on too many cases at once because that may 
result in incompetent representation); Va. Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 1798 (2004) 
(acknowledging the ethical problems related to excessive caseloads for public defenders).  
 68. Joy, supra note 65, at 218–19; see, e.g., S.C. Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 04-12 (2004) 
(“A public defender may not undertake or maintain a caseload that results in the attorney 
violating [the] ethical obligation[] of competence . . . .”). 
 69. Formal Op. 06-441, supra note 53, at 4–5 (2006) (footnotes omitted).  
 70. Id. at 9.  
 71. Id. at 8 (“If a supervisor knows that a subordinate’s workload renders the lawyer unable 
to provide competent and diligent representation and the supervisor fails to take reasonable 
remedial action . . . the supervisor himself is responsible for the subordinate’s violation of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct.”). 
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which operates as a “detailed action plan . . . to which those providing 
public defense should adhere as they seek to comply with their 
professional responsibilities.”72  
Relevant here, Guideline 6 urges public defenders to withdraw 
from current cases when workloads are excessive and to file motions 
asking courts to stop assigning new cases when necessary.73 The 
Comment to Guideline 6 outlines a “mandatory duty” for lawyers to 
take “corrective action” to avoid violations of the Model Rules.74 
“When [public defenders] file motions requesting that assignments be 
stopped and that withdrawals be permitted, their prayer for relief 
should be accorded substantial deference because [they] are in the best 
position to assess the workloads of their lawyers.”75 
If a motion to withdraw or to have a court stop assigning new cases 
is denied, Guideline 7 instructs public defenders to “resist judicial 
directions” that “improperly interfere” with their ethical obligations to 
provide competent representation.76 In passing Guideline 7, the ABA 
was concerned with the independence of public defenders’ offices and 
the potential for courts to “micro-manage the operations of defense 
programs.”77 Although a court may sanction a lawyer for refusing to 
represent a client based on a belief that competent representation is 
not possible, the Guidelines recommend that refusal is nonetheless the 
proper action.78 This seems to suggest that public defenders should 
ignore court orders. This guideline runs counter to the ABA’s formal 
 
 72. EIGHT GUIDELINES, supra note 59, at 1. The Introduction to the Guidelines provides a 
summary of its recommendations: 
Guideline 1 urges the management of public defense programs to assess whether 
excessive workloads are preventing their lawyers from fulfilling performance 
obligations; and Guidelines 2, 3, and 4 relate to the need for continuous supervision 
and monitoring of workloads, training of lawyers respecting their ethical duty when 
confronted with excessive workloads, and the need for management to determine if 
excessive workloads exist. Guidelines 5 through 8 address the range of options that 
public defense providers and their lawyers should consider when excessive workloads 
are present. As set forth in Guideline 6, depending on the circumstances, it may be 
necessary for those providing public defense to seek redress in the courts, but other 
choices may be available, as suggested in Guideline 5, before this step is required.  
Id. 
 73. Id. at 3. 
 74. Id. at 12.  
 75. Id. at 13. 
 76. Id. at 3.  
 77. Id. at 13 (citing In re Certification of Conflict in Motions to Withdraw, 636 So. 2d 18, 21–
22 (Fla. 1994)). 
 78. See id. (“When motions to stop the assignment of new cases and to withdraw from cases 
are filed, [public defenders] resist judicial directions . . . that improperly interfere with their 
professional and ethical duties in representing their clients.”).  
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opinion that says, “If the public defender is not allowed to withdraw 
from representation, she must obey the court’s order while taking all 
steps reasonably feasible to insure that her client receives competent 
and diligent representation.”79 This conflicting guidance poses yet 
another ethical dilemma for public defenders. 
III.  POSSIBLE ROUTES TO REFORM 
Indigent defense reform is badly needed. The most direct route to 
reform is for state legislatures to provide adequate funding, or for 
Congress to provide additional financial support to the states. But a 
shift in legislative priorities is unlikely.80 In 1979, the ABA endorsed 
the creation of an independent, federally funded program to help state 
and local governments discharge their obligation to provide counsel for 
indigent defendants.81 Yet since then, “there is no sign that the federal 
government will help or that state and local governments are ensuring 
adequate funding willingly.”82 
A. Reform Through the Judiciary 
Only a few courts have addressed the constitutional and ethical 
issues associated with excessive caseloads on a system-wide basis. 
Courts have taken at least three different approaches: (1) 
implementing a rebuttable presumption of ineffective assistance of 
counsel and issuing a warning to the legislature, (2) adopting a 
cooperative approach, and (3) following the ABA’s recommendations 
by allowing public defenders to withdraw from cases.83  
1. Rebuttable Presumptions and Warnings to the Legislature.  New 
Orleans public defenders have struggled with overwhelming caseloads 
since at least 1993. In State v. Peart,84 Leonard Peart was charged with 
serious felonies, including aggravated rape and attempted first-degree 
 
 79. Formal Op. 06-441, supra note 53, at 6. 
 80. For further discussion, see supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 81. Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon’s Promise: Lessons from England and the Need 
for Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 841 (2004).  
 82. Peter A. Joy, Unequal Assistance of Counsel, 24 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 518, 531 (2015). 
 83. For further discussion of these three approaches, additional analysis of some of these 
decisions, and a comparison with the federal system, see Jessica Trieu, The Federal Budget Crisis 
and Its Unintended Ethical Consequences: How Will Judges, Prosecutors, and Public Defenders 
Meet Their Ethical Obligations?, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 917, 925–31 (2014). 
 84. State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993).  
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murder.85 Peart’s court-appointed lawyer had represented 418 
defendants in a seven-month period.86 Due to these constraints, the 
public defender filed a “Motion for Relief to Provide Constitutionally 
Mandated Protection and Resources.”87 At a hearing on the motion, 
the trial court found that Peart’s attorney was not able to provide 
clients with effective assistance of counsel, primarily because of his 
excessive caseload.88 The court ruled that the state’s indigent defense 
funding system was unconstitutional as applied in New Orleans.89 It 
ordered that the attorney’s caseload be reduced and directed the 
Louisiana legislature to provide additional funds “to pay additional 
attorneys, secretaries, paralegals, law clerks, investigators, and expert 
witnesses.”90  
This sweeping order did not survive on appeal. The Louisiana 
Supreme Court held that the funding statute was constitutional and, 
citing separation-of-powers concerns, reversed the lower court’s order 
to the legislature to fund indigent defense programs.91 Despite its ruling 
in favor of the state, the Louisiana Supreme Court declared that the 
indigent defense system “faced a crisis” and implemented a rebuttable 
presumption that indigent defendants represented by New Orleans 
public defenders were receiving ineffective assistance of counsel.92 The 
rebuttable presumption placed the burden on the state to prove that 
defense counsel was effective before the trial judge could permit a case 
awaiting trial to proceed.93 
In addition to implementing the seemingly strong medicine of a 
rebuttable presumption of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court warned the legislature:  
If legislative action is not forthcoming and indigent defense reform 
does not take place, this Court, in the exercise of its constitutional and 
inherent power and supervisory jurisdiction, may find it necessary to 
employ more intrusive and specific measures it has thus far avoided 
 
 85. Id. at 784. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. at 785. 
 91. Id. at 791 (“We decline at this time to undertake these more intrusive and specific 
measures because this Court should not lightly tread in the affairs of other branches of 
government and because the legislature ought to assess such measures in the first instance.”). 
 92. Id. at 790–91.  
 93. Joy, supra note 65, at 218. 
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to ensure that indigent defendants receive reasonably effective 
assistance of counsel.94 
After Peart, in 1994, the Louisiana legislature “increased funding 
for public defenders by $5 million and created a task force to study the 
situation in order to remove the rebuttable presumption.”95 This 
funding “did not keep up with inflation keep up with inflation or 
increasing caseloads” in subsequent years.96  
In 2005, twelve years after Peart, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
heard State v. Citizen.97 There, the trial court had appointed counsel to 
represent Adrian Citizen, who was charged with first-degree murder.98 
The parish was unable to provide Citizen an attorney, and the trial 
court ordered the parish to set aside $200,000 for indigent defense.99 
On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court cited and repeated its earlier 
warning in Peart, pointing out “the obvious deficiencies in funding 
from the State to satisfy its constitutional mandate.”100 The court urged 
the legislature to create a state task force to “work diligently to 
formulate specific recommendations.”101 And the court nudged the 
legislature to produce a plan to address the funding and caseload issues 
by a specific date.102  
Despite this additional warning, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
reversed the lower court’s order, again citing separation-of-powers 
concerns.103 It held that if a trial judge determines that adequate 
funding is not available, the judge may prohibit the state from going 
forward with a prosecution until the judge determines that appropriate 
funding is likely to be available.104 
 
 94. Peart, 621 So. 2d at 791. 
 95. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 9, at 120 n.79. For an in-depth description of the changes in 
indigent defense policy in Louisiana after Peart and State v. Citizen, 898 So. 2d 325 (La. 2005), see 
Richard Drew, Louisiana’s New Public Defender System: Origins, Main Features, and Prospects 
for Success, 69 LA. L. REV. 955, 961–76 (2009).  
 96. Adam M. Gershowitz, Raise the Proof: A Default Rule for Indigent Defense, 40 CONN. L. 
REV. 85, 104 (2007) (citing Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., The State of Indigent Defense in Louisiana, 42 
LA. B.J. 454, 457–58 (1995)); see also Drew, supra note 95, at 961–76 (collecting sources and 
detailing the history of Louisiana public defense funding after Peart).  
 97.  State v. Citizen, 898 So. 2d 325, (La. 2005). 
 98. Id. at 327.  
 99. Id. at 329.  
 100. Id. at 336. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. at 338–39.  
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Now, twelve years later, criminal defendants in Louisiana 
continue to await trial without representation. A criminal district court 
in New Orleans recently ordered the release of seven unrepresented 
criminal defendants charged with felonies because they had been 
denied the right to counsel.105    
2. Cooperative Approach.  In State ex rel. Missouri Public Defender 
Commission v. Pratte,106 the Supreme Court of Missouri considered the 
case of a public defenders’ office facing inadequate resources. The 
approach taken there is an example of the courts, prosecutors, and 
public defenders working together to address excessive caseloads.107 
Before the Missouri high court weighed in on the issue, the 
Missouri Senate issued a report about public defense in the state. The 
report found that “the probability that public defenders are failing to 
provide effective assistance of counsel and are violating their ethical 
obligations to their clients increases every day.”108 In response to the 
report, the Missouri Public Defender Commission enacted a regulation 
that limited the number of cases each public defender district and 
individual lawyer could take, set a yearly hour maximum for each 
lawyer, and required that a district be placed on “limited availability” 
status if the number of hours needed to handle its caseload was greater 
than the number of available attorney hours.109 In 2009, two years after 
the implementation of this rule, every Missouri public defenders’ office 
was over its calculated capacity.110 
Addressing this issue, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that the 
proper remedy for an excessive caseload under the regulation is for the 
public defender to “certify the office as having ‘limited availability’ 
once its maximum caseload is exceeded for three consecutive 
months.”111 Once the certification occurs, the public defender notifies 
the presiding judge and prosecutors of the impending unavailability of 
 
 105. See State v. Bernard, No. 528-021, slip op. at 11 (La. Crim. Dist. Ct., Orleans Parish Apr. 
8, 2016) (granting the release of the defendants without dismissing their charges). 
 106. State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870 (Mo. 2009).  
 107. For further discussion of Missouri’s cooperative approach, see Peter A. Joy, Ensuring 
the Ethical Representation of Clients in the Face of Excessive Caseloads, 75 MO. L. REV. 771, 788–
89 (2010). 
 108. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d at 877–78. 
 109. See id. at 878–79 (describing limited availability status as occurring when a public 
defenders’ office exceeds its maximum caseload for three consecutive months). 
 110. Id. at 880. 
 111. Id.  
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services.112 The public defender, prosecutor, and presiding judge then 
confer to agree on measures to reduce demand for public defender 
services, including  
the prosecutors’ agreement to limit the cases in which the state seeks 
incarceration; determining cases or categories of cases in which 
private attorneys are to be appointed; a determination by the judges 
not to appoint any counsel in certain cases (which would result in the 
cases not being available for trial or disposition); or in the absence of 
agreement by prosecutors and judge to any resolution, the rule 
authorizes the public defender to make the office unavailable for any 
appointments until the caseload falls below the commission’s 
standard.113 
This approach allows public defenders, judges, and prosecutors to 
solve the problems of excessive caseloads in a cooperative manner. By 
allowing for cooperation, this approach was thought to “promise[] 
some degree of relief,” while still recognizing that the public defender 
system must be able to limit case intake.114 
Although this cooperative approach sounds like an ideal solution, 
it has not proven effective in practice. In 2010, all attempts to reach 
agreements with prosecutors and judges were unsuccessful.115 The 
Missouri Supreme Court appointed a special master to investigate the 
matter, who concluded that the procedure prescribed in Pratte would 
simply not resolve Missouri’s increasing caseloads and limited 
resources.116 
3. The ABA Approach.  In Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial 
Circuit v. State,117 the most recent state high court case addressing the 
issue of excessive caseloads, the Florida Supreme Court held that the 
public defenders’ office could withdraw from a case “based on 
excessive caseload or underfunding that would result in ineffective 
representation of indigent defendants.”118 Because the Florida 
Supreme Court’s approach allows courts to grant withdrawal motions 
 
 112. Id. at 887. 
 113. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 114. Joy, supra note 107, at 789. 
 115. Professor Peter Joy provides an extensive discussion of the results of and problems with 
Missouri’s approach in Joy, supra note 65, at 220–25. 
 116. Id. at 221. 
 117. Pub. Def., Eleventh Judicial Circuit v. State, 115 So. 3d 261 (Fla. 2013).  
 118. Id. at 282.  
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from public defenders with excessive caseloads, it is consistent with the 
ABA’s formal opinion.119  
There, the public defender for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit filed 
motions seeking to be relieved of the obligation to represent twenty-
one defendants in noncapital felony cases, claiming that excessive 
caseloads caused by underfunding prevented the office from meeting 
its obligation to the defendants.120 The lower court certified the 
question of whether a Florida statute, which prohibited a trial court 
from granting a motion for withdrawal by a public defender because of 
a conflict caused by underfunding or an excessive caseload, was an 
unconstitutional violation of an indigent defendant’s right to counsel.121  
The Florida Supreme Court described the conditions at the Dade 
County Public Defender’s office in stark terms. The office engaged in 
a routine practice of “meet and greet” pleas—public defenders 
“serve[d] as mere conduits for plea offers.”122 The lawyers lacked 
adequate time to investigate cases.123 And the office “triage[d]” its 
cases by giving priority to the cases of defendants in custody.124  
Although the Florida Supreme Court held that the funding statute 
was constitutional on its face, it also held that a statute prohibiting any 
withdrawal would infringe on the court’s “inherent authority” to 
ensure adequate representation of indigent defendants.125 Because of 
the limited amount of time public defenders had to meet with and 
advise their clients about pleas, the court found that the public 
 
 119. For an argument that the Florida approach is consistent with the ABA formal ethics 
opinion, see Trieu, supra note 83, at 930.  
 120. Pub. Def., Eleventh Judicial Circuit, 115 So. 3d at 265.  
 121. Id. at 264–65 (quoting FLA. STAT., § 27.5303(1)(d) (2007)). 
 122. Id. at 278. The Florida Supreme Court further described the situation at the Public 
Defender’s office: 
Witnesses from the Public Defender’s office described “meet and greet pleas” as being 
routine procedure. The assistant public defender meets the defendant for the first time 
at arraignment during a few minutes in the courtroom or hallway and knows nothing 
about the case except for the arrest form provided by the state attorney, yet is expected 
to counsel the defendant about the State’s plea offer. In this regard, the public 
defenders serve “as mere conduits for plea offers.” 
Id. 
 123. Id. (“The witnesses also testified that the attorneys almost never visited the crime scenes, 
were unable to properly investigate or interview witnesses themselves . . . and were often 
unprepared to proceed to trial when the case was called.”). 
 124. Id. (“The witnesses also described engaging in ‘triage’ with their cases—giving priority 
to the cases of defendants in custody, leaving out-of-custody defendants effectively without 
representation for lengthy periods subsequent to arraignment.”). 
 125. Id. at 282. 
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defenders’ office had demonstrated cause to withdraw.126 It determined 
that if the statute prohibiting trial courts from granting motions to 
withdraw from “conflicts arising from underfunding, excessive 
caseload or the prospective inability to adequately represent a client” 
were to be interpreted “as prohibiting any motion to withdraw based 
on excessive caseloads or underfunding, then [the statute] would 
violate the courts’ inherent authority to ensure adequate 
representation to defendants.”127 Instead, the court interpreted the 
statute to not apply if it “preclude[d] a public defender from filing a 
motion to withdraw based on excessive caseload or underfunding that 
would result in ineffective representation of indigent defendants nor [if 
it] preclude[d] a trial court from granting a motion to withdraw under 
those circumstances.”128 The court announced a duty to intervene when 
excessive caseloads amount to “nonrepresentation and therefore a 
denial of the actual assistance of counsel guaranteed by Gideon and the 
Sixth Amendment.”129 Although it provided room for courts to 
intervene, the Florida Supreme Court did not describe how a court 
should determine the circumstances under which a motion to withdraw 
should be granted.130  
B. Class Action Litigation 
Class action litigation allows criminal defendants to seek remedies 
for systemic violations of their right to counsel.131 One example is the 
litigation in Hurrell-Harring v. State, which began in 2007 with a class 
action complaint filed by the New York Civil Liberties Union on behalf 
of indigent criminal defendants in New York.132 The complaint alleged 
 
 126. Id. at 279. 
 127. Id. at 282. 
 128. Id.  
 129. Id. at 278–79. 
 130. Instead, the Florida Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court to make the 
determination. It seems likely, though, that if a public defender, consistent with ABA Formal 
Opinion 06-441, “believes that her workload is such that she is unable to meet the basic ethical 
obligations required of her in the representation of a client,” under the court’s reasoning in Public 
Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit v. State, the court should allow withdrawal. Formal Op. 06-
441, supra  note 53, at 4. 
 131. See generally Costello, supra note 15 (advocating for class action litigation as a strategy 
to remedy right-to-counsel violations and describing several examples of such litigation).  
 132. See Amended Class Action Complaint at 1, Hurrell-Harring v. State, No. 8866-07 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Apr. 28, 2008) (“This civil rights lawsuit is brought to remedy the State of New York’s 
persistent failure to guarantee meaningful and effective legal representation to indigent people 
accused of crimes, as required by the New York State Constitution and laws and the United States 
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that the defendants “face[d] a severe and unacceptably high risk of not 
receiving meaningful and effective assistance of counsel.”133 The 
plaintiffs sought injunctive relief requiring the state “to provide a 
system of public defense consistent with the Constitution and laws of 
the State of New York and the United States Constitution.”134  
The plaintiffs were successful in the trial court, and the state 
appealed to the Appellate Division, where it prevailed in a 3–2 decision 
holding that the complaint was not justiciable on separation-of-powers 
grounds.135 The plaintiffs appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, 
which reversed and remanded to the trial court for a hearing on the 
merits.136 In a 4–3 decision, the court held that the complaint set forth 
a “constructive denial of the right to counsel by reason of insufficient 
compliance with the constitutional mandate of Gideon.”137  
The case gained widespread attention, and the United States 
Department of Justice filed a statement of interest in support of the 
plaintiffs.138 In 2011, a three-judge panel of the Appellate Division, 
Third Department granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class 
 
Constitution.”). For further discussion of the complicated procedural history of the Hurrell-
Harring litigation, see LEFSTEIN, supra note 9, at 183–86. 
 133. Hurrell-Harring Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 132, at 5. The complaint 
also provides extensive descriptions of the systemic failures of the New York public defense 
system. See id. at 4 (detailing an extensive list of deficiencies, including restrictive client-eligibility 
standards, a lack of standards for attorney supervision and monitoring, and a lack of attorney 
training and resources for support staff, among other failures); see generally COMM’N ON THE 
FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., FINAL REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF 
NEW YORK (2006) (detailing the findings of a commission with the responsibility to “examine the 
effectiveness of indigent criminal defense services across the State, and consider the alternative 
models of assigning, supervising, and financing assigned counsel compatible with New York’s 
constitutional and fiscal realities”). 
 134. Hurrell-Harring Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 132, at 103.  
 135. Hurrell-Harring v. State, 883 N.Y.S.2d 349, 351, 355 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).  
 136. Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 228 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2010). 
 137. Id. at 225.  
 138. Statement of Interest of the United States at 1, Hurrell-Harring v. State, No. 8866-07 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 21, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/09/25/
hurrell_soi_9-25-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQT4-UB66]. It states:  
It is the position of the United States that constructive denial of counsel may occur in 
two, often linked circumstances: (1) When, on a systemic basis, lawyers for indigent 
defendants operate under substantial structural limitations, such as a severe lack of 
resources, unreasonably high workloads, or critical understaffing of public defender 
offices; and/or (2) When the traditional markers of representation—such as timely and 
confidential consultation with clients, appropriate investigation, and meaningful 
adversarial testing of the prosecution’s case—are absent or significantly compromised 
on a system-wide basis. 
Id. 
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certification,139 and the day before the case was set to go to trial in 2014, 
the parties reached a settlement agreement.140 In the settlement 
agreement, the state agreed to assume responsibility for funding and 
oversight of indigent defense in five of its sixty-two counties.141 The 
settlement ensures that every poor criminal defendant will have a 
lawyer at his or her first court appearance.142 It requires New York to 
hire enough lawyers, investigators, and support staff to ensure that all 
poor criminal defendants have lawyers with the time and support 
necessary to vigorously represent their clients.143 It provides for the 
setting of caseload standards that will substantially limit the number of 
cases any lawyer can carry, and requires the state to spend more than 
$4 million to increase attorney communications with poor criminal 
defendants.144 The settlement also mandates the creation of eligibility 
standards for representation, and it provides that the plaintiffs will 
receive detailed reports allowing them to monitor compliance with the 
agreement.145 
The Hurrell-Harring settlement agreement was successful in 
forcing the state to provide funding for indigent defense and to remedy 
systemic Sixth Amendment violations. The main drawback to this 
strategy, though, is that it takes time. The complaint in Hurrell-Harring 
was filed in 2007, and a settlement was not reached until 2014. All the 
while, the plaintiffs remained in jail, and indigent criminal defendants 
continued to receive inadequate representation.  
IV.  ORLEANS PUBLIC DEFENDERS: AN OFFICE IN CRISIS 
The OPD is in crisis. The office represents more than 85 percent 
of the criminal defendants in New Orleans,146 and it was assigned over 
20,000 cases in 2015.147 That year, the OPD handled nearly 10,000 
misdemeanors, nearly 8,000 felonies, 220 cases designated Life 
 
 139. Hurrell-Harring v. State, 914 N.Y.S.2d 367,372 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011). 
 140. Hurrell-Harring Stipulation and Order of Settlement, supra note 16, at 5–9; N.Y. Civil 
Liberties Union, supra note 16 (describing the settlement agreement).  
 141. Hurrell-Harring Stipulation and Order of Settlement, supra note 16, at 5–9. 
 142. Id. at 5. 
 143. Id. at 8. 
 144. Id. at 10–11. 
 145. Id. at 11–12, 14–15. 
 146. Transcript of Court Proceedings at 45, Louisiana v. Wroten, No. 520-385 (La. Crim. Dist. 
Ct., Orleans Parish Nov. 20, 2015) [hereinafter Wroten Transcript]. 
 147. Id. at 52. 
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Without Parole, and two capital cases.148 Each of the OPD’s sixty staff 
attorneys is assigned to hundreds of cases at a time.  
A. Unreliable Funding Structure for Indigent Defense 
In New Orleans, funding for public defense is not a high priority: 
in 2015, “citizens appropriated nearly $200 million dollars” for law 
enforcement and the district attorney, but only $1.5 million for the 
OPD.149 The budget crisis at the OPD is attributable to the funding 
mechanism the state has put in place.150 Almost two-thirds of funding 
for Louisiana public defenders comes from a “user pay” funding 
mechanism: traffic cameras, tickets, and statutory fees.151 The statutory 
fees include a $45 public defender’s fee assessed whenever a defendant 
is convicted after trial, pleads guilty or no contest, or forfeits a bond.152 
Because the fee is not assessed if a defendant is found not guilty, the 
OPD gets “paid to lose.”153 
The funding structure is necessarily unreliable because the 
amount of money collected in traffic tickets each year varies 
unpredictably.154 If sheriffs choose to reduce traffic enforcement, 
public defender revenues drop. The OPD has “no control over these 
revenue streams, their collection, or disbursement.”155 Funding can be 
reduced for reasons like “severe weather, elections and other political 
vagaries, judicial action, reductions in road traffic, and the lack of 
 
 148. The exact numbers are: 9,513 misdemeanors, 7,911 felonies, 8 capital cases, and 2,690 
revocations. ORLEANS PUB. DEF., 2015 ANNUAL REPORT (2017), http://www.opdla.org/images/
files/2015-annual-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZQP-5AGZ]. 
 149. Id.  
 150. For more background on the origins of the state funding structure and an insightful 
critique of the criminal-justice system in post-Katrina New Orleans, much of which remains 
relevant to the problems the OPD faces today, see Brandon L. Garrett & Tania Tetlow, Criminal 
Justice Collapse: The Constitution After Hurricane Katrina, 56 DUKE L.J. 127, 145–54 (2006). 
 151. LA. PUB. DEF. BD., LPDB 2014 ANNUAL BOARD REPORT 1, 22 (2015) [hereinafter 
LPDB ANNUAL REPORT]; John Burkhart, The Crisis in Public Defense Funding: The 
Approaching Storm & What Must Be Done, 62 LA. BAR J. 360, 361 (2015); see also Wroten 
Transcript, supra note 146, at 33−34 (criticizing the “user pay” system and indicating that up to 
half of the OPD budget is made up of fines and fees). 
 152. LPDB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 151, at 26. 
 153. If You Can’t Afford a Lawyer, REVEAL (Dec. 3, 2016), https://www.revealnews.org/
episodes/if-you-cant-afford-a-lawyer [https://perma.cc/59ZS-WKPC].   
 154. See LPDB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 151, at 22 (“Law enforcement can unilaterally 
reduce traffic enforcement. Traffic cases can be diverted so that no proceeds reach the public 
defender in the district. . . . Further, district offices are entirely reliant upon their counterparts in 
the criminal justice system to collect and remit the fines . . . needed to operate their respective 
offices.”). 
 155. Id. at 1.  
FACTOR IN PRINTER FINAL(LATEST).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2017  9:20 AM 
2017] LESSONS FROM NEW ORLEANS 1589 
interstate or major highways in a particular jurisdiction.”156 Due to this 
unreliable funding mechanism, in its 2014 Annual Report, the 
Louisiana Public Defender Board (LPDB)157 presciently warned of an 
impending “systemic failure” in the Louisiana public defense system.158 
The LPDB recommended that the state “[r]estructure” its 
criminal-justice funding scheme.159 The board urged the legislature to 
create a task force to study more reliable measures and develop 
recommendations to ensure adequate funding for the criminal-justice 
system.160  
B. OPD’s Response to the Budget Crisis 
The unreliability of the OPD’s funding structure is evidenced by 
the 2015 projections for revenue being short by more than $300,000, as 
well as the state’s reduction of OPD funding by $700,000 for 2016.161 
OPD attorneys’ workloads are beyond manageable levels.162 And New 
Orleans maintains a trial rate well above the state and national 
averages.163  
Further complicating the problem, the Orleans Parish district 
attorney boasts a case-acceptance rate of over 90 percent.164 Unlike the 
OPD, the New Orleans district attorney “cannot let budget constraints 
affect [his] ability to operate.”165   
In a letter to criminal-justice stakeholders in New Orleans 
providing an overview of a proposed “restriction of services plan,” 
OPD Chief Defender Derwyn Bunton noted that the funding crisis 
 
 156. Id. at 22.  
 157. The Louisiana Public Defender Board (LPDB) is the state board charged with oversight 
of local public defenders’ offices. The LPDB was created by the Louisiana legislature in 2007 in 
response to widespread problems in the quality and consistency of legal representation for 
Louisiana’s indigent residents. Id. at 1. Its mission statement states, “Through its commitment to 
performance standards, ethical excellence, data-driven practices and client-centered advocacy, 
the LPDB oversees the delivery of high quality legal services.” Mission and Vision, LA. PUB. DEF. 
BD., http://lpdb.la.gov/About/Mission%20and%20Vision.php [https://perma.cc/8S9D-6BEQ].  
 158. LPDB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 151, at 23 (“We expect at least 25 of 42 district 
offices will lack the funds to cover their expenses during the coming fiscal year, FY16 . . . .”).  
 159. Id. at 3.  
 160. Id.  
 161. Letter from Derwyn Bunton, Chief Dist. Def., Orleans Public Defenders, to New 
Orleans Criminal Justice Stakeholders (June 18, 2015) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 162. ORLEANS PUB. DEF. OFF., RESTRICTION OF SERVICES PLAN: FISCAL YEAR 2016, at 4 
(2015) [hereinafter RESTRICTION OF SERVICES PLAN].  
 163. Id. 
 164. Id.  
 165. If You Can’t Afford a Lawyer, supra note 153. 
FACTOR IN PRINTER FINAL(LATEST).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2017  9:20 AM 
1590  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1565 
“compromises the OPD’s ability to provide mandated legal services, 
brings higher costs in our criminal justice system, and ultimately puts 
public safety at risk.”166 Bunton announced that, if the excessive 
caseloads continued, the office would “place appointed clients on a 
waitlist for representation” so attorneys could manage their 
caseloads.167 And if the excessive caseloads continued for “an extended 
length of time,” the OPD would “begin refusing new case 
appointments.”168 
In response to these budget shortages and excessive caseloads, in 
July 2015, the OPD initiated a “restriction of services plan.”169 The plan 
describes the dilemma as a “triangle” of public defense.170 This refers 
to a three-way balancing of the constitutional obligation to provide 
competent effective counsel, the ethical obligations of the profession, 
and the obligation to comply with state professional standards.171  
The plan entails a hiring freeze, office-wide furloughs and a 
caseload-monitoring program. It also eliminated representation for 
capital cases and began refusing to contract for new noncapital cases.172 
The OPD expected that public defenders’ caseloads would rise once 
the plan went into effect.173  
In addition to the plan, the OPD launched a crowdfunding 
campaign to help cover its costs.174 The campaign raised around $85,000 
from thirty-six states and twelve countries.175 
C. Implications of the Restriction of Services Plan 
Once the OPD is appointed to a case, it takes weeks to assign it to 
an available OPD lawyer, leaving defendants on a waiting list for 
 
 166. Letter from Derwyn Bunton, supra note 161, at 2.  
 167. Id. 
 168. RESTRICTION OF SERVICES PLAN, supra note 162, at 4. 
 169. Id. at 2. 
 170. Id. at 4. 
 171. Id. at 4–5. 
 172. See Letter from Derwyn Bunton, supra note 161, at 2 (providing an overview of the 
Restriction of Services Plan). 
 173. RESTRICTION OF SERVICES PLAN, supra note 162, at 2. 
 174. In response to the crowdfunding campaign, John Oliver quipped that “nobody should be 
in jail because a Kickstarter didn’t meet its goal.” Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Public 
Defenders (HBO television broadcast Sept. 13, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
USkEzLuzmZ4 [https://perma.cc/QGL7-NAZB]. 
 175. ORLEANS PUB. DEF., supra note 148. 
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representation.176 Since the plan went into effect, funding cuts have 
caused the OPD to lose seventeen felony attorneys and a total of thirty-
seven staff positions.177 As of March 2017, the office has sixty total 
attorneys, with fifty-one “line attorneys” who take on a full caseload 
and work between sixty and sixty-five hours per week.178 The office has 
only thirteen investigators to handle the entire OPD caseload.179 
1. Criminal District Court Hearing on Caseloads.  In response to 
its excessive caseloads, the OPD requested that the New Orleans 
criminal district courts stop appointing it to new cases.180 Testimony 
from a district court hearing on the request demonstrates the dilemma 
facing the OPD.181 At the hearing, the OPD put on testimony from the 
state public defender, the chief public defender for Orleans Parish, and 
legal ethics experts. The hearing testimony indicated that, under its 
current caseloads, the OPD’s practices violate the Louisiana Rules of 
Professional Conduct182 regarding competence, diligence, 
communication with clients, confidentiality of information, conflicts of 
interest, declining or terminating representation, responsibilities of 
 
 176. See Ken Daley, Judge: Patience Running Out on Orleans Public Defenders’ 
Unavailability, NOLA.COM (Apr. 4, 2016, 2:25 PM), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2016/
02/judge_warns_patience_running_o.html [https://perma.cc/PAN3-57H5] (describing statements 
from a New Orleans judge to the OPD chief of trials, including, “[y]our office needs to step up to 
the plate and start finding attorneys for these clients,” and setting a deadline for the OPD to 
appoint an attorney to a case); Richard Fausset, New Orleans Puts Poor on ‘Waiting List’ for 
Lawyers, Suit Alleges, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/16/us/new-
orleans-public-defender-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/7DHB-HZPG] (“The steps, which vary 
from office to office, include instituting waiting lists and hiring freezes, and refusing some new 
cases.”).  
 177. Email from Lindsey Hortenstine, Commc’ns Dir., Orleans Public Defenders, to author 
(Mar. 13, 2017, 09:27 EST) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 178. Id.  
 179. Id. 
 180. Note that the OPD requested that the court stop appointing the OPD to new cases, 
rather than announce that the office would no longer take any new cases. The OPD was also not 
seeking to withdraw from its currently pending cases at the hearing; instead, it sought “a 
prospective remedy,” asking that “this Court does not appoint future cases to our office.” Wroten 
Transcript, supra note 146, at 7. This distinction is significant, because the OPD has the authority 
to refuse to take new cases altogether, yet it chose to request judicial relief.  
 181. Id.  
 182. The Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct are substantially similar to the Model 
Rules. See, e.g., Dane S. Ciolino, Rule 1.1.: Competence, LA. LEGAL ETHICS, https://
lalegalethics.org/louisiana-rules-of-professional-conduct/article-1-client-lawyer-relationship/rule
-1-1-competence [https://perma.cc/7W6P-ELEN] (stating, in a section titled “Model Rule 
Comparison,” that “[t]his rule is substantially similar to ABA Model Rule of Professional 
Conduct 1.1”); see generally LA. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT (adopting an essentially identical 
structure to that of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct).  
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managers and supervisory lawyers, and responsibilities of a 
subordinate lawyer.183  
These ethical violations impact the constitutional rights of nearly 
all of the criminal defendants in New Orleans. Professor Ellen 
Yaroshefsky, a legal ethics expert, reviewed affidavits of OPD 
attorneys and testified about the problems at the OPD.184 She 
explained that the office does not operate consistently with the rules185 
and recommended that the OPD not take future cases.186 She observed 
that OPD lawyers “have gotten to the point where there’s a systemic 
violation of the rules of professional conduct.”187 OPD lawyers have to 
“make a decision of triage; and triage is a conflict of interest and that’s 
a systemic problem in this office.”188 From the witness stand, 
Yaroshefsky described the conditions at the OPD: “You’re not 
operating a justice system here. You’re operating a processing 
system.”189 
By juggling too many cases and engaging in “triage” to decide how 
to allocate time and resources, OPD lawyers operate under continuous 
concurrent conflicts of interests: each new case a public defender takes 
on above a manageable caseload materially limits that lawyer’s ability 
to recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for other 
clients.190 With regard to competence, the lawyers do not have 
sufficient time to meet with and counsel clients.191 With regard to 
diligence, the lawyers lack the time and resources to adequately 
investigate cases.192 
 
 183. See generally Wroten Transcript, supra note 146 (describing the problems caused by 
excessive caseloads at the OPD).  
 184. Id. at 70.  
 185. Id. at 76.  
 186. Id. at 75.  
 187. Id. at 72. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 72. 
 190. See id. at 87–88 (“[T]he entire operation of the OPD, operates with a conflict of 
interest. . . . [W]ith the number of cases that they have . . . they’re simply not able to adequately 
provide competent counsel to the vast majority [of their clients].”). 
 191. See id. at 114 (“If you’re not even able to see your client until the day before trial, 
particularly a mentally ill client, it’s nearly impossible to prepare adequately for whatever kind of 
hearing you have and certainly for trial.”). 
 192. See id. at 77–78 (“They can’t investigate cases. They can’t serve subpoenas and so they 
haven’t done what is necessary to be a diligent lawyer.”); id. at 91 (“It’s a systemic problem . . . . 
It can’t be a system where the courts, among other actors, just expect lawyers are going to stand 
up without doing any work essentially because they can plead guilty and put people through a 
plea mill . . . .”); see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INDIGENT 
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2. Court Order Releasing Unrepresented Defendants.  After the 
hearing, the court did not relieve the OPD from taking new cases. The 
court did, however, offer (fleeting) relief to some unrepresented 
indigent criminal defendants by ordering their release.193 These 
defendants were charged with serious felonies, including second-
degree murder, first-degree rape, and armed robbery with a firearm.194 
They had been incarcerated without the assistance of counsel for 
between 81 and 138 days.195 The state has appealed the release order, 
so, for now, the defendants remain incarcerated. But the court’s 
pronouncement that “defendants’ constitutional rights are not 
contingent upon budget demands, waiting lists, and the failure of the 
legislature to adequately fund indigent defense” strikes at the heart of 
the problem caused by the OPD’s excessive caseloads.196  
In its order releasing the defendants, the court criticized the state 
legislature’s failure to fund public defense. The court noted that the 
public defenders’ lack of preparation and the absence of pretrial 
investigation “raise[d] serious concerns” about the defendants’ access 
to effective assistance of counsel.197 It found that the “defendants’ 
attorneys have demonstrated that they cannot effectively represent 
their clients without adequate funding and resources.”198 The court 
“ha[d] no difficulty concluding [that] the defendants’ constitutional 
right to assistance of counsel [was] being violated.”199 Because of the 
“absence of a date certain” for when sufficient funding for indigent 
defense would be available, the court held that the New Orleans 
indigent defense system violated the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.200  
 
DEFENSE SERIES # 4, KEEPING DEFENDER WORKLOADS MANAGEABLE 5 (2001) (“If a judge 
with responsibility for appointing counsel . . . recognizes that overwhelming caseloads may 
jeopardize a defendant’s right to competent representation of counsel, it is the judge’s 
responsibility to identify and rectify the situation.”).  
 193. State v. Bernard, No. 528-021, slip op. at 11 (La. Crim. Dist. Ct. Apr. 8, 2016). 
 194. Id. at 7–8. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 10. 
 197. Id. at 9. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id.  
 200. Id. at 11 (“The absence of a date certain when proceedings are to begin and when 
adequate funding will be made available by the legislature for constitutionally mandated 
representation of defendants who cannot afford an attorney violates the Sixth Amendment 
right[s] to counsel and effective assistance of counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause.”). 
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3. Class Action Lawsuits.  In response to the restriction of services 
plan, the ACLU filed a class action lawsuit in the Middle District of 
Louisiana on behalf of New Orleans’s unrepresented indigent 
defendants who had been placed on a waiting list by the OPD.201 The 
plaintiffs alleged that, by placing them on a waiting list for 
representation, the OPD (acting through Chief Defender Bunton) had 
violated their Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to assistance of 
counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and 
equal protection.202 
The court criticized the broken indigent defense system, but 
ultimately dismissed the case on “comity and federalism grounds.”203 It 
said, “It is clear that the Louisiana legislature is failing miserably at 
upholding its obligations under Gideon. Budget shortages are no 
excuse to violate the United States Constitution.”204 Yet it concluded 
that this crisis was not able to surmount “the difficult federalism 
obstacles” associated with obtaining injunctive relief from a federal 
court.205 The court dismissed the case because any declaratory or 
injunctive relief by the federal court “would inevitably lead . . . [the 
court] to become the overseer of the Orleans Parish criminal court 
system, a result explicitly condemned by the United States Supreme 
Court in Younger and O’Shea.”206 As did the courts in the cases 
described above,207 the court punted the problem to the legislature: 
“Lasting relief will only come when the legislature locates an adequate 
source of funding for public defense offices.”208 
The Southern Poverty Law Center has also recently filed a class 
action lawsuit against Louisiana Governor John Bel Edwards in state 
 
 201. See Class Action Complaint at 14–15, Yarls v. Bunton, No. 3:16-cv-31 (M.D. La. Jan. 14, 
2016), 2016 WL 212997 (summarizing the plaintiffs’ claims for relief under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments).  
 202. Id. at 14. It is worth noting that the parties’ interests were not completely adverse. 
Because as the defendant, Bunton did not contend that his placing the plaintiffs on a waiting list 
was constitutional, there was “no disagreement as to liability.” Yarls v. Bunton, No. 16-31-JJB-
RLB, 2017 WL 424874, at *3 (M.D. La. Jan. 31, 2017). The court noted that the “parties are 
aligned in seeking a judicial declaration . . . in an apparent attempt to place pressure on the 
Louisiana legislature to increase funds for public defense services.” Id. at *1 n.10. Because of this 
friendly party alignment, the court “at every turn . . . had to question the nature of its own power 
without the aid of the illumination that ‘concrete adverseness brings.’” Id. at *3.     
 203. Yarls, 2017 WL 424874, at *1. 
 204.  Id. at *7 (footnote omitted).  
 205.  Id. at *4.  
 206. Id. at *3. 
 207. See supra Part III.A.  
 208.  Yarls, 2017 WL 424874, at *7. 
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court.209 The plaintiffs are seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, 
alleging that the state has violated their rights under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.210 
*        *        * 
The OPD remains in crisis. Criminal defendants in New Orleans 
are stuck on waiting lists for representation, and OPD attorneys still 
have unmanageable caseloads. Recognizing this crisis, the president of 
the ABA wrote a letter to Governor Edwards, urging him to 
adequately fund indigent defense in the state.211 The OPD chief 
defender wrote an op-ed in the New York Times describing the 
challenges the OPD faces: “[P]oor defendants have been left to 
represent themselves. And . . . judges have threatened public defenders 
with contempt for refusing to take a case.”212  
Yet counterintuitively, the actions taken by the OPD may have 
worked to reorient legislative priorities. The New Orleans City Council 
recently approved a new 2017 budget that funds the OPD “at or above 
2016 levels in the final budget” while cutting funds for the Orleans 
Parish District Attorney’s Office.213 And in response to the crisis, the 
Louisiana legislature has provided more funds for the OPD. Although 
the bill did not provide any net new money for public defense, it 
increased the percentage of funds allocated to district public defender 
offices like the OPD.214 Yet in doing so, it diverted funds away from 
 
 209. Verified Petition for Class Certification and Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2–4, 
Allen v. Edwards, No. 655079 (La. Dist. Ct. Feb. 6, 2017), 2017 WL 1056616, at *2–4. 
 210.  Id. 
 211. See Letter from Paulette Brown, President, Am. Bar Ass’n, to John Bel  
Edwards, Governor, La., at 4 (Mar. 30, 2016), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
uncategorized/GAO/2016mar30_louisianapublicdef_l.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2S
V-NQLN] (“This is a critical time for Louisiana with respect to public defense. . . . The ABA asks 
that you do everything in your power to ensure that Louisiana public defense is properly funded 
so that attorneys may meet their constitutional and ethical obligations.”).  
 212. Derwyn Bunton, Opinion, When the Public Defender Says, ‘I Can’t Help,’ N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/19/opinion/when-the-public-defender-says-i-
cant-help.html [https://perma.cc/2G7B-MKM5]. 
 213. Greg LaRose, New Orleans City Council Approves 2017 Budget, with  
More and Less for Criminal Justice, NOLA.COM (Nov. 17, 2016, 7:15 PM), http://www.nola. 
com/politics/index.ssf/2016/11/new_orleans_city_council_appro_18.html [https://perma.cc/FX8S-
KNUM]; 2017 Proposed Operating Budget, http://nolacitycouncil.com/docs/resources/2017-
Proposed-Operating-Budget-Book.pdf [https://perma.cc/T22Y-ZU8J]. 
 214. 2016 La. Sess. Law Serv. 571 (West); Julia O’Donoghue, Lawmakers Look to Shift 
Money to Public Defenders—from Death Penalty Appeals, NOLA.COM (Apr. 7, 2016, 6:35 PM), 
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capital defense programs in the state.215 The OPD chief defender spoke 
out against the bill,216 and the Louisiana District Attorney’s 
Association supported it.217 Although the bill has some serious defects 
(for example, reshuffling funds away from one class of criminal 
defendants to another), it shows a willingness by the legislature to 
respond to the indigent defense crisis in the state. 
The OPD case study shows that public defenders can play a 
powerful institutional role in spurring legislative reform. The 
unreliable funding system created a budget shortfall, which caused 
public defenders’ caseloads to rise beyond already unmanageable 
levels. In response, the OPD has refused cases to maintain ethically 
manageable workloads. These actions have left hundreds of people 
accused of serious crimes without representation. A public safety crisis 
resulted when a court released some of these unrepresented 
defendants. And the crisis has garnered national attention. Thus, by 
refusing new cases, the OPD has caused governance problems that 
keep the spotlight on public defense and put political pressure on 
legislators.  
In addition to the forcing legislatures to respond, refusing new 
cases aligns with the ABA’s recommendations218 and public defenders’ 
ethical obligations.219 Rather than engaging in “triage” and working in 
a “processing system” for pleas, refusing to take new cases allows 
public defenders to maintain constitutionally permissible caseloads.  
Had the OPD continued to take new cases, criminal defendants 
would have continued to receive inadequate representation. By 




 215. See O’Donoghue, supra note 214 (noting that House Bill 1137 diverts funds from “capital 
defense to local public defender offices”). 
 216. See Louisiana House of Representatives, Administration of Criminal Justice—Hearing 
on HB 818 (La. Apr. 7, 2016), http://house.louisiana.gov/H_Video/VideoArchivePlayer.aspx?
v=house/2016/apr/0407_16_CJ [https://perma.cc/7W9K-FZLX] (testimony beginning at minute 
sixty-nine). 
 217. Karen Kidd, DA Association Backs Bill Aimed at Troubled Louisiana Public  
Defender Board, LA. REC. (Apr. 30, 2016, 12:11 PM), http://louisianarecord.com/stories/
510720184-da-association-backs-bill-aimed-at-troubled-louisiana-public-defender-board [https://
perma.cc/F3B4-PT47]. 
 218. Formal Op. 06-441, supra note 53, at 4 (“If a lawyer believes that her workload is such 
that she is unable to meet the basic ethical obligations required of her in the representation of a 
client, she must not continue the representation of that client . . . .”). 
 219. For further discussion of the ethical problems associated with excessive caseloads, see 
supra Part II. 
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have perpetuated an unjust and unconstitutional system. Instead, 
cognizant of budget constraints, they took actions to maintain their 
ethical obligations and their clients’ right to the effective assistance of 
counsel.   
Of course, refusing cases is not the perfect solution to the funding 
crisis.220 The Louisiana legislature still has not adequately funded 
public defense in the state, and criminal defendants in New Orleans 
remain on waiting lists for representation. This approach only creates 
pressure; it provides no immediate institutional reform. But it is a 
starting point. When criminal defendants are unrepresented both in a 
literal and political sense,221 public defenders can and should play a role 
in the political process by refusing to take new cases.  
CONCLUSION 
The right to counsel is a fundamental tenet of the criminal-justice 
system. Yet that right is regularly denied to indigent criminal 
defendants who happen to be arrested in states that choose not to 
adequately fund public defense. Absent a crisis, indigent defense is not 
a top priority for state legislatures, and separation-of-powers and 
federalism concerns have prevented courts from forcing legislatures to 
take action. As the OPD case study shows, public defenders are in a 
unique position to put pressure on legislatures. By refusing to take new 
cases beyond ethical workloads, they can both maintain their 
obligations to the profession and ensure constitutional representation 
for their clients.  
 
 
 220. See Steiker, supra note 44, at 2701 (“There is clearly no silver bullet here; rather the 
answer . . . involves the long, slow, and concerted effort of all possible institutional actors.”). 
 221. See William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1975 (“A criminal justice 
system under the thumb of voters and politicians is a system prone to act on majoritarian 
prejudices.”). 
